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Abstract 
This article examines the most recent political events taking place in the Republic of 
Moldova, as well as the crisis resulting from the invalidation of the elections for the 
mayor of Chișinău. The political regime in Moldova can be considered as “electoral 
authoritarian”, due to the degradation of the quality of democracy after 2014. The 
response of Western chancelleries to the invalidation of the elections for the mayor of 
Chișinău came as a cold shower for the political establishment in Moldova. The 
European Commission, the European Parliament, the State Department of the United 
States, and noteworthy Western chancelleries sent an unprecedented message and 
announced that they would freeze granted loans. Western chancelleries decided to 
enforce this unprecedented measure because a red line was crossed when the results of 
the elections were annulled. With only several months to go until the Parliamentary 
elections take place in Moldova, the nullification of the vote for the mayor office of the 
capital city fuels a political tension, which has reigned for several years in Europe’s 
poorest country, a nation depopulating at a rate encountered only in conflict zones. 
Following Erevan and Tblisi, Chișinău could be the capital where the pressure applied 
by public protests generates major political change. 
 
Keywords: Andrei Năstase, Vladimir Plahotniuc, Igor Dodon; Rodica Berdilo, election 
for the mayor of Chișinău, Republic of Moldova.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Following 2015, the Republic of Moldova went from valedictorian of the 
Eastern Partnership to a major headache for Brussels. What had seemed like 
minor missteps up to 2014, abuses that could have easily been corrected by a 
coalition willing to embrace the European Union, turned out to be a 
foreshadowing of a new type of regime specific to the former Soviet bloc, 
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“electoral or competitive authoritarianism”1. According to professor Vladimir 
Gel’man, this regime is characterized by “formal and informal rules that 
construct prohibitively high barriers to participation; sharply unequal access of 
competitors to financial and media resources; abuses of power by the state 
apparatus for the sake of maximizing incumbent votes; and multiple instances 
of electoral fraud”2. 
In less than a decade of following “a European path”, the Republic of 
Moldova slipped under the control of oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc. The latter 
invested resources in building a political monopoly by placing both the state 
apparatus and the dominant political party, Democratic Party of Moldova 
(DPM) under subordination of his personal authority. Yet Plahotniuc’s most 
significant tool turned out to be the Judiciary, his control of courts, from 
ordinary tribunals to the Supreme Court, as well as the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, all of which were decisive both in protecting businesses 
and in consolidating political influence. Today, the objective of the regime in 
Chișinău is to avoid anything that might pose a threat to the status quo by 
prohibitively building barriers to entry in the political scene, actively 
implementing divide et impera tactics, co-opting “fellow travellers” of the 
oligarch, pushing out “non-systemic” actors into an anti-establishment “ghetto”. 
Authoritarianism in the Republic of Moldova, as it took shape during the 
previous two, three years, is very different from its classical version, commonly 
known as a “dictatorship”, and is more similar to that established in Russia, and 
in other former Soviet republics. In Chișinău, the regime maintains the face of 
democratic institutions, such as the Parliament, political parties, and elections, 
but it disempowers and perverts the essence of these institutions, thereby 
creating what professor Gel’man ingeniously referred to as a “democratic 
Potemkin village”3. As in the case of other electoral authoritarian regimes, it is 
becoming ever clearer that Moldova is only mimicking democratic institutions 
in an attempt to co-opt as many demographic segments as possible and decrease 
the risk of political conflict.   
The authoritarian regime in Moldova is the result of conflicts harbored 
by the post-Soviet elite, which were very harsh during the 1990s, and wherein 
the winner “took it all”. Hence why Plahotniuc is so desperate to block any 
                                               
*  Armand Goșu is Associate Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Bucharest 
(armand.gosu@fspub.unibuc.ro). 
1 The most notable author elaborating this concept is prof. Vladimir Gel’man, while 
Authoritarian Russia. Analyzing post-soviet regime changes, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2015 is, without a doubt, the most significant work in this regard. 
2 Idem, “The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia”, in Demokratizatsiya. 
The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, January 2014, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 504.  
3  Ibidem, p. 506.  
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attempted change that might lead to colored revolutions and ultimately result in 
the removal from the front stage of the current political and economic elite.  
After a second round of voting on June 3
rd
, the election results for the 
mayor’s office of Chişinău were cancelled out of the blue. This constitutes an 
event with no precedent in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. 
Perplexingly, this happened after all the observers present at the tiebreaker, 
representatives of internal and international organizations, civic activists, the 
political parties, as well as the other candidates running for the same position 
agreed that the runoff voting took place in fair conditions, with no foul play in 
sight. The winner had already been congratulated and the Chişinău judiciary 
had to complete a simple formality, that of validating the results, given that no 
complaints or requests to rescind were registered. 
Not even in Belarus, Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation did the 
judicature ever nullify a voting outcome just because the governing party 
disagreed with the result. There have been documented cases in Georgia (2003) 
or in Ukraine (2004) where numerous international observers signaled electoral 
fraud or civil society organizations, which ended up in the reorganization of the 
vote that saw the representatives of the opposition win. In Belarus or Russia, 
opposition candidates are commonly forced out of electoral races by various 
means of abuse, but never before have we witnessed an electoral result being 
cancelled because the outcome is unfavorable to the ruling coalition. And 
especially not for local elections.  
In what follows, the article first describes the contradictory positions of 
the Moldovan justice system, then in a second stage reconstitutes the events that 
led to the decision, which annulled the victory of Andrei Năstaseș thirdly, we 
look at the Romanian state’s involvement in this crisis, as well as at the 
different stakes of diverse actors, and then conclude with a look at the aftermath 
of the crisis which includes protests and foreign reactions of the European 
Union and the United States.  
 
 
The Mysteries Of The Moldovan Justice System 
 
At the end of May 2017, the liberal mayor of Chişinău, Dorin Chirtoacă, was 
detained under charges of corruption and influence peddling in a lawsuit 
concerned with paid parking spaces in the capital city. Consequently, the 
mayor’s office was given over (in an illegal manner, some had protested) to 
Silvia Radu, a close acquaintance of the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who was 
interim mayor for almost a year. In February 2018, Chirtoacă formally resigned 
from his office, which called for snap local elections. The Democratic Party of 
Moldova (DPM), the governing body led by Plahotniuc, did not enter the race. 
They would not have had a chance given their low public approval, as well as 
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the overwhelming negative reputation of their leader in the eyes of more than 
90% of the voters. Instead, the oligarch preferred to unofficially endorse the 
“independent technocrat” Silvia Radu, for whom the media outlets controlled by 
Plahotniuc aggressively campaigned. The most slandered mayoral candidate by 
Plahotniuc’s and Igor Dodon’s media channels was Andrei Năstase. The latter 
is currently the leader of the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (DTPP), an 
alternative political body that emerged in the wake of the widespread outrage 
brought about by the theft of one billion dollars of public money at the end of 
2015. Năstase’s campaign was also endorsed by the Party of Action and 
Solidarity (PAS), led by the former presidential candidate and minister of 
Education Maia Sandu. Despite a clumsy, severely underfunded campaign, the 
rallying of PAS and DTPP helped Năstase reach the second round of voting, to 
the surprise of ballot observers, and notwithstanding all public opinion polls, 
while oligarch-powered Silvia Radu was far from being a threat.  
Andrei Năstase’s presence in the second round of voting was a surprise 
not only to the majority of the public opinion and foreign observers, but also to 
himself. The outcome of the second turn, held on June 3, saw Năstase become 
the elected mayor of Chişinău with 52,57% of the votes. His entire campaign 
was centered on a bold anti-oligarchic and pro-European message, with Vlad 
Plahotniuc as the main target for his political criticism. The latter publicly 
acknowledged the victory of the leader of the opposition the following day: 
“The mayor’s office of our capital city is now under the control of the 
opposition, and this is a good thing for the balance of power in a state, but also 
because the right-leaning opposition now has the possibility to assume an 
important responsibility and work for the people”4. In what concerns the 
ballotage, Plahotniuc remarked upon the “democratic manner” in which they 
were conducted
5
. In addition, the socialist candidate Ion Ceban, defeated in the 
second tour, recognized Andrei Năstase’s victory. Even his administrative and 
party superior (as Ceban is a spokesperson for the President’s office), Igor 
Dodon, granted and accepted the voting outcome. Nonetheless, three weeks 
later, on June the 25
th
, the Supreme Court of Justice decided to invalidate the 
election results for the mayor’s office of Chişinău.  
 
 
How Did This Happen? 
 
Two days after the election’s conclusion, on June the 5th, the socialists’ 
candidate Ion Ceban had forwarded two appeals to the courthouse of the Central 
sector of Chişinău. According to the political analyst Igor Boţan, quoted by 
                                               
4  “Reacția Partidului condus de Plahotniuc după victoria lui Năstase”, Ziarul de gardă, 
iunie 2018, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-politice/reactia-partidului-condus-deplahotniuc- 
dupa-victoria-lui-nastase (Accessed 4 June 2018). 
5 Ibidem.  
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“Ziarul de gardă,” the two claims were irrelevant because they were not submitted 
within the amount of time legally permissible for this procedure, calling to 
record the annual syntheses of the Supreme Court of Justice that stipulate this 
very fact
6
. Nevertheless, the courthouse accepted them and began an inquiry. 
The first appeal was concerned with citizens from another country partaking in 
Năstase’s electoral campaign, mentioning leaders of the Romanian National 
Liberal Party (NLP) and members of the European Peoples’ Party who had 
come to Chişinău to lobby for Năstase. The second claim involved the posting 
of call-to-vote messages for the citizens on social media in the days of the 
election. The socialist candidate’s lawyer, Nicolae Fomov, stated that “these 
posts were seen 82.000, 71.000, 30.000 times, as well as many more times, 
respectively, and they could have impacted the election”7. 
The video messages called to record by the socialist party make up the 
usual communications that take place during election days. This is one of them: 
“Come out in bundles to vote. In the voting booth, it’s just you faced with your 
own conscience and only God is your witness. Vote according to your wish but 
come and vote”8. Andrei Năstase’s messages do not differ in any way from 
those posted by the other candidates on the same occasion. A Chişinău media 
outlet collected all of the messages posted during election days by other 
candidates in the past four years and they resemble in both form and content, 
down to their punctuation
9
. Moreover, Ceban, the socialist candidate, had the 
same call to action on social media. It is perhaps for this reason that neither the 
losing candidate, nor his legal representative, Fomov, requested the nullification 
of the election outcome. During the first few days, journalists barely paid 
attention to these proceedings, most of them being unaware of their taking 
place. Only the appeal regarding foreign participation in the electoral campaign 
                                               
6  „Expert politic: E non-sens ce se întâmplă. Dacă nu știi cum au fost influențate alegerile 
de ce le invalidezi?”, Ziarul de gardă, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-politice/expert-
politic-e-non-sens-ce-se-intampla-daca-nu-stii-cum-au-fost-influentate-alegerile-de-ce-le-
invalidezi (Accessed 24 June 2018). 
7  Doina Stimpovschii, „Culmea injustiției la miezul nopții! Alegerile locale n-au fost 
validate din cauza live-urilor pe Facebook”, Timpul, 25 iunie 2018, 
https://www.timpul.md/articol/culmea-injustiiei-la-miez-de-noapte-alegerile-locale-n-au-
fost-validate-din-cauza-live-urilor-pe-facebook-132173.html (Accessed 25 June  2018). 
8  „Standarde duble la validarea mandatelor? Ce au declarat Dodon, Corman, Leancă, Sandu 
și Petrenco în ziua alegerilor”, Ziarul de gardă, 23 iunie 2018, https://www.zdg.md/ 
stiri/stiri-politice/video-duble-standarde-in-validarea-agitatiei-electorale-la-alegerile-din-
r-moldova (Accesed 25 June 2019).  
9  „Dodon, Candu, Filip, Ghimpu, Filat și Năstase: mesaje similare pe Facebook în 'ziua 
tăcerii'. Doar unul a fost invalidat”, Ziarul de gardă, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-
politice/doc-dodon-candu-filip-ghimpu-filat-si-nastase-mesaje-similare-pe-facebook-in-
ziua-tacerii-doar-unul-a-fost-invalidat (Accessed 24 June 2018). 
 
298  ARMAND GOȘU 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 2 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
had made it to the media, but the inquiry predictably came to a swift conclusion. 
The appeal was rejected.  
The second claim, regarding Facebook messages that called for people 
to vote, has a strange story, to say the least. To begin with, the Centre sector 
courthouse first rejected it as baseless, having been forwarded too late to 
become the purpose of an inquiry. Either way, nobody had ever considered 
these calls to action as illegal electoral practice. However, the Court of Appeal 
had some surprises in store. On June the 12
th
, the Court ruled that the attempt to 
mobilize voters during the election days was a form of electoral agitation. As 
such, the law had allegedly been broken. But this decision had also passed 
unnoticed by the public opinion. Neither did the courtroom state in what way an 
invitation to vote posted on social media might influence the result of an election, 
nor did the judiciary specify what consequences their decision might have. 
The curious development of this second appeal converged with the 
bureaucratic procedures of validating the election result for the mayoral office 
of Chişinău. The courthouse hearing was postponed from June the 15th to 
Monday, the 18
th
 of June, on the grounds that two appeals, both authored by the 
socialist party and concerning possible foul play with the second round of the 
election, had been advanced to the judicature. On June the 18
th
, the validation 
was postponed once more, as the courtroom admitted a request by the Electoral 
Constituency Council from Chişinău to challenge the judge. 
The following day, Tuesday the 19
th
 of June, the judiciary of Centre 
sector decided that the result of the mayoral election, which had taken place on 
June 3 was not to be validated. Judge Rodica Berdilo called to record the Court 
of Appeal’s decision on June 12, and after three hours of private debate ruled 
that calling citizens to vote in the day of the election is an unlawful practice, 
claiming that both of the second round candidates, Năstase and Ceban, are 
guilty of broadcasting such messages. The legal representative of the socialists 
re-claimed on this occasion that the law had actually been violated by the 
participation of foreign citizens in the campaign, which was the object of the 
first appeal, not by the electoral messages. However, three separate judiciaries 
had ruled against the complaint that foreign parties had endorsed Năstase’s run. 
And then they were left with the second appeal, regarding social media posts 
bidding people to go vote. Judge Berdilo decided that the Facebook posts 
addressed “to an uncontestably larger number of people than the difference 
between the two candidates demonstrates that the elections, upon their 
conclusion, were altered by the behavior of the candidates”10. The Centre sector 
Court nullified the election outcome through this decision, despite the fact that 
                                               
10  „Cum a motivat Judecătoria Chișinău decizia de a nu valida alegerile din Capitală”, 
Anticorupție, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/cum-a-motivat-judecatoria-chisinau-decizia-
de-a-nu-valida-alegerile-din-capitala (Accessed 24 June 2018).  
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neither of the candidates, nor the Electoral Constituency Council from Chişinău 
had requested such a resolution. 
A significant number of independent political commentators claim that 
Rodica Berdilo is acting upon a political order. Several others have wondered, 
with good reason, if the judge actually understands the way in which social 
media works. It is impossible to establish whether some 250,000 combined 
views of three video messages recorded and posted by Năstase actually 
occurred during the election days or whether they happened subsequently. For 
that matter, it is impossible to determine whether the views belong to pro-
European voters that are of age, individuals who are currently living on the 
territory of the Republic of Moldova and who are legally domiciled in Chişinău, 
people who would lawfully classify as citizens and who might have voted in the 
election
11
. 
A couple of days later, in a post on her own Facebook page, judge 
Berdilo invoked an article from an Electoral Code which references another 
article, from another Code, giving credibility to the fact that the sentence might 
have actually been passed by another individual. It is highly unlikely that 
someone else wrote a post on her own Facebook page
12
. On June the 21
st
, the 
magistrates of the Court of Appeal decided to uphold the sentence passed by the 
Centre sector Court, which invalidates the outcome of the second round of 
voting on the 3
rd
 of June.  
With just one other possible way out in the form of the Supreme Court 
of Justice, the pro-European opposition organized a rally on June the 24
th
 in the 
Great National Assembly Square, Chişinău. On this occasion, the protesters 
accused the oligarch Plahotniuc for ordering the Moldovan justice, which is 
under his control, to prevent Andrei Năstase from taking the mayor’s office at 
any costs, regardless of the election’s outcome. 
 
“Plahotniuc wants to show us that we don’t matter, that he can commit anything, 
including crimes against the Republic of Moldova. We want to tell him that enough is 
enough, that we’re fed up. He appropriated everything in all these years. He made away 
with the justice system and laws were passed under his bidding. They ventured to take 
away our most precious right, the right to vote. We know them to be thieves, up-starts, 
but Plahotniuc demonstrated in these past few days that he’s much more than a thief, 
                                               
11  Maksim Andreev, „Отмена результатов выборов в Кишинев в трех шагах. Как это 
было и что дальше” Newsmaker, 23 июня, http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/otmena-
rezultatov-vyborov-v-kishineve-v-treh-shagah-kak-eto-bylo-i-chto-dalshe-37961 
(Accessed 24 June 2018). 
12  Elena Robu, „Eroare gravă a judecătoarei Rodica Berdilo în mesajul postat pe facebook”, 
28 iunie 2018, https://elenarobu.md/eroarea-grava-a-judecatoarei-rodica-berdilo-in-
mesajul-postat-pe-facebook/ (29 iunie 2018); Radu Carp, “Decizia de invalidare a 
alegerilor de la Chișinău a fost luată la București?”, Adevărul, 3 iulie 
2018,https://adevarul.ro/news/politica/deciziade-invalidare-alegerilor-chisinau-fost-luata-
bucuresti-1_5b3b9719df52022f75d03879/index.html (Accessed 3 July 2018). 
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that he’s on his way to becoming a dictator. If we don’t put an end to this now, our 
country will see dictatorship installed”13. (Maia Sandu) 
 
Alongside Vlad Plahotniuc, judge Rodica Berdilo was also the object of harsh 
criticism. She asked the Superior Council of Magistracy, a less active institution 
that also enjoys low public approval, to defend her. In turn, the institution did 
her bidding and accused political campaigns of defamation and impacting “the 
credibility of the process of justice, as well as the independence and impartiality 
of the judge”14.  
 On June the 25
th
, the Supreme Court of Justice definitively sealed the 
fate of the elections, rejecting Andrei Năstase’s complaint and invalidating the 
outcome of the elections for the mayor’s office at the beginning of the month. In 
fact, the judges of the Supreme Court did not assume anything, saying that this 
was not a decision they could make, and so the ruling of the inferior court 
remained valid
15
. 
 The internal reactions to the nullification of the result were predictable. 
President Dodon declared that the court’s decision sets a dangerous precedent in 
the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The ones to blame for the 
political crisis brought about by the cancellation of the election result are 
allegedly the “Euro-unionists,” but the socialists would win the autumn 
elections and things would then go back to normal. Igor Dodon even revealed 
some of the plans that the socialists have in store. The president hopes that they 
would gain a majority in the Parliament, which would allow them to nominate 
whoever they want for government offices. A different scenario, wherein the 
Parliament does not benefit from a socialist-led majority, likely due to PAS and 
DTPP leaders’ refusal to collaborate with Palahotniuc, would mean snap 
parliamentary elections simultaneously with local elections in the summer of 
2019. President Dodon is firmly convinced that those snap elections would 
eventually lead to a victory on behalf of the Socialists’ Party, reassuring Ion 
Ceban that, when this happens, he will also be victorious in his run for the 
mayorship of Chişinău, during the normal elections16. 
                                               
13  „Proteste masive pentru ziua de duminică, 24 iunie, anunțate de Maia Sandu și Andrei 
Năstase”, Anticorupție, 22 iunie 2018, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/proteste-masive-
pentru-ziua-de-duminica-24-iunie-anuntate-de-maia-sandu-si-andrei-nastase (Accessed 24 
June 2018).  
14 „ Reacția CSM după protestul avocaților: afectează imaginea şi independența sistemului 
judecătoresc”, Ziarul de gardă, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiâri-justitie/reactia-csm-dupa-
protestul-avocatilor-afecteaza- imaginea-si-independenta-sistemului-judecatoresc 
(Accessed 25 June 2018). 
15  „Curtea Supremă de Justiție a respins contestația primarului ales Andrei Năstase”, Radio 
Europa Liberă, 25 iunie 2018, https://www.europalibera.org/a/29318845.html (Accessed 
25 June 2018). 
16  Maksim Andreev, „,Так тому и быть’. Реакция Игоря Додона на отмену выборов в 
Кишиневе – в трех пунктах”, Newsmaker, 26 июня 2018, http://newsmaker.md/ 
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The controversial oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc
17
 responded in an interview 
for the unionist publication “Timpul”, which is partially financed by the 
government in Bucharest.
18
 The majority of the commentators in Chişinău are 
convinced that the interview was entirely written in Romania’s capital city, by 
people close to the Alliance of Liberal Democrats (ALDE) party, as well as to 
the minister for external affairs, T. Meleşcanu. For that matter, Romania is 
known in international chancelleries to unconditionally support DPM leader 
Vlad Plahotniuc. In his “Timpul” “interview”, Plahotniuc claims that the 
decision to invalidate the Chişinău elections sets a dangerous precedent, 
including for his own party. Had this been an authentic interview, it would have 
deserved a more thorough analysis, as it contains several perplexing, as well as 
inaccurate statements. It is noteworthy to mention one aspect, however, namely 
the emphasis that is placed on a storyline according to which Plahotniuc has 
absolutely no power in Moldova, wherein the justice system is independent, and 
the West asking for Chişinău to deal with this problem is completely unacceptable. 
If Plahotniuc had read the interview before its publication in “Timpul”, he would 
have disagreed with such a narrative, because, as it turns out, he claims the 
exact opposite in the many, heavily financed articles published in international 
media, as well as in discussions with foreign emissaries, to whom he frequently 
underlines his control of the Republic of Moldova, but also his role as the only 
viable liaison between the country and the West. 
Foreign responses were equally predictable. In a statement of the US 
embassy in Chișinău – later endorsed by a memo from the State Department – it 
was emphasized that the spoiling of the election results is a threat to 
democracy
19
. The statements of the High Representative of the European Union 
                                                                                                                   
rus/novosti/tak-tomu-i-byt-reaktsiya-igorya-dodona-na-otmenu- vyborov-v-
kishineve-v-treh-punkta-38002 (Accessed 27 June 2018). 
17  Vladimir Plahotniuc was born in Călărași raion of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic. He holds a BA in food engineering from Chișinău Technical University. In the 
unclear circumstances he came to Bucharest at the beginning of 2000 being appointed 
general director to Petrom Moldova, the biggest branch of the most important Romanian 
oil company. Plahotniuc got Romanian citizenship in 2002. Since 2009, he had another 
identity in Romania under the name Vlad Ulinici, with different ID documents. He started 
to play a preeminent public role after April 2009, becoming the richest businessman and 
the most influential politician in Moldova. For more details, see Armand Goșu, „Republic 
of Moldova. The Year 2015 in Politics”, in Studia politica. Romanian Political Science 
Review, vol. XVI, nr. 1, 2016, pp. 30-33.  
18  Vlad Plahotniuc, „Au fost presiuni interne și din exterior ca Guvernul și PDM să intervină 
ca decizia judecătorilor să fie pentru validarea alegerilor”, Timpul, 26 iunie 2018, 
https://www.timpul.md/articol/plahotniuc-au-fost-presiuni-interne-i-din-exterior-ca-
guvernul-i-pdm-sa-intervina-ca-decizia-judecatorilor-sa-fie-pentru-validarea-alegerilor-
132324.html (Accessed 26 June 2018). 
19  “The Moldovan Supreme Court’s non-transparent decision to uphold the invalidation of 
Chisinau’s June 3 mayoral elections represents a threat to Moldovan democracy. The 
winning candidate in Chisinau’s mayoral race received a majority of the votes. 
International observers found relatively minor irregularities that would not justify 
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for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, as well as that of 
the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement 
Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, were harsher and more elaborate
20
. 
Taking notice of the reactions of Moldovan media, which was 
controlled to a large extent by Plahotniuc and Dodon, but also the manner in 
which his statements to a journalist from Europa Liberă were misconstrued, 
Comissioner Hahn made himself even clearer through a more explicit post on 
social media later that day:  
 
“Judiciary’s role is not to modify the electoral choice of the people. None of the 
participants of the electoral process asked for annulation of the elections. It is 
unprecedented that regular practices, usual for previous electoral processes in Moldova, 
were considered a breach of electoral rules, leading to invalidation of elections. 
Measures foreseen by law for such situations had not been applied.”21 (Johannes Hahn, 
EU-Commissioner for European Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations) 
 
The strain placed on relations between Chișinău, on the one hand, and Brussels and 
Washington, on the other, might prevent several instalments of current loans from 
reaching the Republic of Moldova, where they are sorely needed. Moldovan 
diplomacy will require many months to mend these misunderstandings, but 
Plahotniuc, the leader of the governing body, does not have too much time at his 
disposal. Parliamentary elections are right around the corner, while the economic 
and financial situation of Moldova remains precarious. Certainly, as always in such 
situations of crisis, Bucharest is there to send money not so much to the Republic of 
Moldova, but specifically to Plahotniuc, who controls the country and whose 
oligarchic regime is considered to be necessary by the Romanian establishment. 
 
 
Catch-22 
 
The ruling of the Moldovan judiciary threw the country into a total halt. 
Especially in the unionist publication “Timpul”, financed by the Romanian 
                                                                                                                   
invalidation of the election results, and there were no calls from election participants to 
invalidate the results. The Court’s unusual and unwarranted decision thwarts the electoral 
 will of the Moldovan people and damages respect for the rule of law and democratic 
principles in Moldova. As Secretary Pompeo emphasized to Prime Minister Filip in their 
June 25 meeting, free and fair elections are the hallmark of a democratic government and 
must reflect the will of the country’s citizens without political interference.” 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283586.htm (Accessed 25 June 2018).  
20  “Statement by the Spokesperson on the validation of the election of the Mayor of 
Chisinau”, 20/6/2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46971/ 
statement-spokesperson-validation-election-mayor-chisinau_en (Accessed 22 June 2018). 
21  Johannes Hahn, “Judiciary's role is not to modify the electoral choice of the people. None 
of the participants of the electoral process asked for annulation of the elections”, 
https://twitter.com/JHahnEU/status/1011909876585558021 (Accessed 24 July 2018). 
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government, Vlad Plahotniuc proposes a narrative according to which 
Moldovan justice is independent, and the oligarch can do nothing but take note 
and promise to encourage legislation reform, soon to be voted by the majority 
he controls in Parliament. The problem is that, short of the author of the 
interview (certainly not Plahotniuc), no one believes this story; not even Vlad 
Plahotniuc himself and certainly no one from Bruxelles or Washington. 
It was hard to imagine that this narrative was credible. The price for 
DPM to join the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) has been, ever since 
2009, the control over the State’s Attorney, and later, over the entire justice 
system of the Republic of Moldova. Plahotniuc’s power, which has grown 
steadily since 2010 and which became overwhelming after the incident of the 
Princely Forest and the enforcement of the Iurie Leancă government, was based 
precisely on his control of the judiciary. Through prosecutors and judges, 
Plahotniuc marginalized and even sentenced to prison his chief opposition, 
beginning with Vlad Filat, former Prime Minister and the leader of the most 
significant pro-European party, the Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova. That 
Plahotniuc completely controls justice in the Republic of Moldova is a 
commonplace, well known by any chancellery analyst or foreign ministry. For 
several years, the protocol between AEI parties, whereby DPM assumed control 
of the State’s Attorney and the National Anticorruption Centre, has been made 
public. During a television show, it was presented by Mihai Ghimpu, the leader 
of LP, a party of unionist rhetoric with numerous ties to Bucharest. This makes 
it all the more curious to see the urgency placed on the “independence” of 
Moldova’s justice system. 
We might explain the mix-up of narratives through the fact that there 
are at least two groups in Romania which are connected not only to the secret 
services on the banks of the Dâmbovița, but also to Moldovan political parties, a 
situation that offers them access to resources and to funds, first and foremost. 
One of these groups, however, lost the dividends it had enjoyed before LP was 
removed from power and Dorin Chirtoacă was discharged from the mayor’s 
office of Chișinău. The result was a nervousness that transpired throughout all 
the articles of the members of this group. The other group, directly linked to 
DPM, more powerful at present, and desiring exclusive access to Moldovan 
resources, is a cross-party association, PSD-ALDE, and an inter-institutional 
one, from the Presidential Administration to the secret services, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Bucharest city hall. Some of these structures define the 
national interest of Romania, which, to the stupor of certain foreign chancelleries, 
has become the unconditional support of Plahotniuc’s political regime. 
It is no accident that publications sponsored by the government of 
Romania are now promoting the narrative of an “independent justice” in 
Moldova, a story that is not bought in the West. This is not necessarily because 
Plahotniuc is a former leader of the criminal world of post-Soviet Moldova or 
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because a Westerner would never want to bury their political career by 
associating themselves with him. Too few have heard of Moldova, so this is of 
little importance. The problem is that Plahotniuc introduces himself to public 
meetings as the man who controls Moldova, and who defends it from Russian 
tanks. As a matter of fact, Vlad Plahotniuc has used the Russian threat intensely 
in order to legitimize the usurpation of power. Yet now, he attempts to convince 
the West that he is not in control, even though he had previously assured 
everyone that he was.  
Nonetheless, both the reports of the State Department and those of the 
European Commission constantly intercept the meddling of power in the affairs 
of Moldovan justice, which is always criticized. Even a former minister of 
Justice and former president of the Constitutional Court admitted, several 
months ago, that the justice reform had failed. The dust had not yet settled on 
certain sensitive case files, such as the raider attacks carried out with the help of 
courthouses, the laundering of over 20 billion U.S. dollars for Russian Mafia 
after the Soci Olympiad, the last-minute removal of several parties from the 
electoral race, also carried out through the justice system, the obstruction of the 
prosecution’s investigation of the billion-dollar theft from three Moldovan 
banks, and many others. In addition to these, there are countless testimonies 
from within the justice system of the Republic of Moldova which certify the 
fact that prosecutors and judges are politically maneuvered, corrupt
22
, and 
terrorized; and they are all pointing to Plahotniuc.  
Thus, it would be ridiculous for someone to entertain the thought that 
the decision to nullify the elections in Chișinău was made by independent 
judges who creatively, securely, and coincidentally interpreted certain 
paragraphs previously read with the opposite meaning by their colleagues in 
many other contexts. Of course, ridicule is yet to kill someone, so there will be 
many who will pretend to take this story seriously.  
Nevertheless, the new narrative encouraged in an interview by a 
publication sponsored by the Romanian government is unlikely to pass as truth. 
Those who launched it knew as much. So why did they do it? 
 
 
The Political, Economic, Personal And Criminal Stakes Of 
This Crisis 
 
The story of an independent justice was launched in order to obstruct the 
validation of Andrei Năstase’s mayoral mandate. Although the State 
                                               
22  „Cum i-a facut justiția milionari pe judecătorii care au anulat alegerile”, Ziarul de gardă,  
28 iunie 2018, https://www.zdg.md/editia-print/cum-i-a-făcut-justiția-milionari-pe-
judecătorii-care-au-anulat-alegerile (Accessed 28 June 2018). 
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Department and the European Commission do not buy it and continue to lobby 
for the will of the electorate in Chișinău, the Republic of Moldova will not yield 
under any circumstance. Not because the elite in Chișinău believe in the 
independence of justice; they likely think it worthless. But because keeping 
Andrei Năstase away from the mayor’s chair has become a strategic objective 
on which the survival of this elite depends. 
The radical change in the attitude towards Năstase’s victory can be 
explained through the fact that the current power in Chișinău was firmly 
convinced he had no chance in the elections. When he made it to the second 
round and then won the elections, the former hoped Andrei Năstase’s critical 
attitude would be moderated and that he would collaborate with the system of 
power dominated by the symbolic figure of the oligarch Plahotniuc. There were 
even speculations of certain commentators close to socialists according to 
which Plahotniuc had favored the election of Năstase in an attempt to prepare 
the collaboration of DPM, PAS and DTPP, following the Parliamentary 
elections, when these parties could have formed a new Alliance for European 
Integration. Such speculations illustrated the fear of socialists that DPM might 
create an anti-PSRM majority in the future Parliament. 
Keeping Năstase away from office was essential to preserving the 
political balance. Had he assumed office, he would have become part of the 
system, handled resources, and set a trend of growth in terms of the political 
influence of the extra-parliamentary opposition for the electoral campaign in the 
fall of 2018.  
The problem of the pro-European, anti-oligarchic opposition is that it 
wages battle on two fronts, both against the socialists of President Dodon, who 
is endorsing a pro-Kremlin discourse, and against the allegedly pro-European 
oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. 
To fight on two fronts is a major tactical error. At least, that’s what the 
manual says. However, Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase have no other option. 
They have correctly identified their adversary in the person of Vlad Plahotniuc. 
The pro-Russian president Dodon is created and controlled by the oligarch. 
Even if they were to win the Parliamentary elections, the socialists cannot 
saddle Moldova and ride it over Ukraine in order to reach the bosom of Russia. 
And what could they give to President Putin? Kremlin barely has enough 
financial resources for itself; it has nothing to send to Chișinău. The political 
elite in Moldova are aware that money is to be found in the West, with the EU 
and the IMF, not in Moscow. 
Since he refused to accept the geopolitical scenario, with Russian tanks 
blocked by Plahotniuc on the Dniester River, Andrei Năstase complicated the 
game, and therefore had to be removed from it at any cost. Had he been allowed 
to enter the city hall, the DTPP-PAS alliance might have obtained a score at 
least twice as high as DPM, which Plahotniuc wished to avoid. In fall, DPM 
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requires a minor ally which they can dominate and with which to establish a 
new AEI. However, it is unlikely that one will appear. Maia Sandu refuses to 
commit political suicide and remains allied with Andrei Năstase, regardless of 
the siren songs coming from Bucharest. As such, the scenario unveiled by 
President Dodon, according to which the Parliament might be unable to create a 
ruling majority in fall, and might thus trigger snap elections, should be taken 
seriously.  
In other words, obstructing the validation of the mayoral mandate can 
also be interpreted as the abandonment of the project to constitute a pro-
European coalition (DPM, PAS, DTPP) dominated by the democrat leader 
following Parliamentary elections. This is why it has become important for PAS 
and DTPP to register the lowest possible scores in the future poll. In order for 
this to happen, the alliance of the two political forces must be destabilized, and 
removing Năstase from the city hall is probably the first step.  
Another cause, which might explain the adventure of the mayoral 
mandate of Adrian Năstase was revealed after June the 3rd, when a series of 
abuses of power and controversial case files of the local administration 
surfaced. The results had hardly been announced when Năstase took his 
attributions seriously. He met with representatives of international banks, with 
various ambassadors, he requested assistance for issues of architecture and 
urban planning, etc. Most importantly, he protested in the street to prevent the 
demolishing of a symbolic building for the center of Chișinău, namely the 
“Gaudeamus” cinema. In fact, this case brought hundreds of people out in the 
street, all of whom requested that the elect mayor intervene. As usual, the land 
involved was more important, no less than 2.500 square meters (25 acres) at the 
heart of the capital city, purchased for the price of an automobile in 2010. The 
building and the land were in a specially designated area, which meant that 
nothing could be built there. The owner, however, had forwarded a request in 
2016 in order to modify the urban plan of the area and build a fifteen story 
block of flats. The request was not resolved, but this did not prevent the Local 
Council from granting authorization for the demolition of the cinema on March 
22, 2018. The demolition itself began just after Năstase won the elections. 
During the council meeting on June 14, the alteration of certain urban plans for 
the area was also introduced in the order of the day, but the elected mayor 
stopped the procedure through public pressure. 
“Gaudeamus” is only one case, which has received most attention from 
the media. Behind it, however, lies a dramatic truth. Various real-estate mafias 
control the city of Chișinău, and especially the historic center. For a long time, 
the business of real-estate developers had been discreetly controlled by the 
Liberal Party of Mihai Ghimpu, whose nephew, Dorin Chirtoacă, was mayor. 
Certain areas or businesses were controlled by Filat, others, by Dodon, but there 
was a balance between the different groups. That relative balance was 
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decisively broken when Chirtoacă was handcuffed. Prior to this, businesses 
controlled by Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (LDPM) in Chișinău had 
been overtaken by Plahotniuc’s DPM. Since May 2017, “the boss” of real-estate 
developers (“krysha”, or rooftop, in Russian; that is, the one who ensures 
political protection) has been the well-known oligarch. According to the 
Moldovan press, last year’s summer saw the end of the bohemian period of the 
liberal Ghimpu. Since then, the control of real-estate companies that partitioned 
Chișinău has been scientifically orchestrated. The peak of these businesses is 
represented by real-estate projects “Prima Casă” and “Arena sportive,” both of 
which are veritable black holes in the local and state budgets. Chișinău is 
engulfed by intemperance of constructions, some of them, illegal. It is an 
unprecedented phenomenon. And Năstase’s mayorship seriously threatened the 
business. There were too many hundreds of millions of dollars in play, and this 
half-criminal world could not have stood by as the new mayor ruined its 
business, for the protection of which the “krysha” is paid. 
The last drop was likely the construction in no. 1 Bogdan Voievod. 
Here, the city hall illegally provided authorization for the construction of a 
block of flats, although the urban plan for the area did not allow for it. The 
certificate was issued for five lots of land, two of which were part of the county 
property. There was no decision of the Local Council to modify the ownership 
of the two lots of land, but this did not prevent the construction company from 
beginning the deforestation. In addition to the fact that the real-estate developer 
was building on the land of the city hall, the authorization they had was in 
violation of the urban plan, according to which, buildings higher than 25 meters 
could not be built in the area, and the dwelling stock could not exceed 50% of 
the terrain’s surface. The developer is El Dorado Terra, previously controlled by 
LP, but currently backed – according to certain information in the press – by 
Plahotniuc himself. This was already too much for the oligarch; he could not 
accept an attack on his own businesses. Not being able to protect even these 
businesses would send a very bad message, namely that the “krysha” is useless. 
According to Alexandru Slusari, a close collaborator of the elected mayor, the 
visit in no. 1 Bogdan Voievod created a terrible panic in the real-estate business, 
something that he and Andrei Năstase later understood. After they made the 
case public, they received copies of tens of case files regarding alleged abuses 
of power, which had been committed by authorities for various constructions. The 
latter determined Slusari to conclude that this particular file was the last drop. 
A final argument, which contributed to the decision to obstruct the 
validation of the mayoral mandate, must have been the very strong, personal 
animosity of Plahotniuc towards Andrei Năstase. The latter was a prosecutor, a 
successful lawyer, and a graduate of Law School at the University in Iași. As a 
lawyer, he had been involved in lawsuits against Plahotniuc since 2010 and the 
first significant raider attack by means of which the future oligarch took control 
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of Victoria Bank, where his client Victor Țopa, now a refugee in Germany, 
owned stock. Practically, from that moment forward, Andrei Năstase has been 
fighting against what he sees as the abuses of power of Plahotniuc, as well as 
intensely promoting the fight against corruption, transparency in the act of 
justice, etc. What distinguishes Năstase from the majority of his countrymen is 
an insane courage to publicly state what everyone else is thinking and 
discussing over the kitchen counter, behind closed doors. For this courage, 
however, he has paid a heavy price. His family has been living in Germany for 
years, and, night after night, he has been the target of the calumnies of 
Plahotniuc’s media holding.  
 
 
The Aftermath: Protests And Foreign Reactions 
 
The decision made by the Supreme Court of Justice to invalidate the election of 
the mayor has generated a civic protest movement wherein an important role is 
played by civil society organizations, in addition to political parties. On June 
the 27
th, the leaders of PAS, DTPP, and LDPM, Maia Sandu, Andrei Năstase, 
and Viorel Cibotaru, together with notable figures of Moldovan civic society, 
laid the foundation for the National Resistance Movement, which is meant to 
oppose “the dictatorship installed by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc”. According 
to statements made during the press conference launching the resistance 
movement, the latter requests the validation of the election, the annulment of 
the mixed voting system, as well as “criminal charges against the judges who 
nullified the election”23. The founders of the movement addressed the 
population in a plea to “create cells of the National Resistance Movement in 
every county of the Republic of Moldova.”24 A great protest rally was 
announced for Sunday, July 1
st
. 
Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Committee convened on June 29 to 
decide the fate of the elections in the capital city. The decision of the 
Committee was predictable, on the one hand, but also surprising, on the other. 
Invoking the decision of the courts of law, it annulled the second round, which 
had taken place on June the 3
rd
. Surprisingly, however, the Committee also 
annulled the first round, from May 20, even though this was never requested by 
anyone and its results were not invalidated by the courts. The Central Electoral 
Committee resolved that the next elections for the mayor of Chișinău would 
take place in the summer of 2019, together with local elections across the entire 
                                               
23  Vitalie Călugăreanu, „A fost creată Mișcarea de Rezistență Națională pentru demolarea 
,regimului Plahotniuc'. Plahotniuc amenință subtil”, 27.06.2018, https://www.dw.com/ 
ro/a-fost-creată-mișcarea-de-rezistență-națională-pentru-demolarea-regimului-plahotniuc-
plahotniuc-amenință-subtil/a-44427138 (Accessed 28  June 2018).   
24  Ibidem. 
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territory of the Republic of Moldova. As such, an interim mayor will lead 
Chișinău for another year, without the support of the voting citizens.  
Several commentators and experts clarified under what terms the 
legislation stipulates the annulment of elections. Thus, according to the ruling of 
the Constitutional Court on December 16, 2016, it is clear that “during an 
electoral campaign, certain irregularities are possible, but the validity of the 
elections depends on the dimensions and magnitude of the former, as 
ascertained by the state authorities”25. As for the conditions necessary to 
invalidate a ballot, the Constitutional Court stipulated that several must be 
cumulated: that the elections are spoiled through fraud, that the results of the 
elections are influenced as a result of this fraud, that the annulment request is 
filed right away, and that the claim according to which elections were 
fraudulently influenced is backed by evidence. In an utterly inexplicable 
fashion, the Court of Appeal, which ruled for the invalidation of the results of 
the second round, completely ignored the legislation, as well as the rulings of 
the Constitutional Court. Thus, the decision to invalidate the vote slipped away 
from the sphere of justice and into that of politics
26
.     
The invalidation of the elections worsened the public approval of the 
judiciary, which stands accused not only of incompetence, but also of political 
partisanship and corruption. With regard to the Parliamentary elections to take 
place in a few months, introducing mixt voting in a single round and cancelling 
the elections in Chișinău might increase absenteeism among voters, according 
to some commentators. The arbitrary reading of the law diminishes not only the 
trust of the people, but also that of foreign chancelleries, while creating a severe 
precedent for Parliament. 
On July 1
st, a tense atmosphere in the center of Chișinău accompanied 
the protest of the “resistance movement” against “the dictatorship” of the 
Plahotniuc-Dodon regime. In front of several tens of thousands of people, the 
leaders of the opposition and notorious figures of the civil society requested that 
the local elections be validated, that those judges who invalidated the ballot be 
held accountable, and that the mixed electoral system implemented last year be 
cancelled. After hours of protest in the Great National Assembly Square, 
thousands of people began their march towards the headquarters of the 
Democrat Party while chanting: “Down with the Mafia!”. The protesters 
resolved to issue a call to peaceful, civic disobedience and announced a great 
assembly of citizens from within and from outside the country for August the 
26
th27
. 
                                               
25 „Cum se separă justiția de politică în Moldova...”, 28 iunie 2018, 
http://www.ipn.md/ro/special/92067 (Accessed 2 July 2018). 
26 Ibidem. 
27 „Protest masiv în PMAN: ‘Oprim dictatorul!'”, 2 iulie 2018, http://www.ipn.md/ro/ 
arhiva/92118 (Accessed 2 July 2018). 
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The first consequence of the unprecedented violation of certain 
elementary norms of democracy by the authorities in Chișinău soon became 
obvious. The EU went further than a mere declaration and decided to suspend 
the payment of the first installment of the Macro-Financial Assistance program 
for the Republic of Moldova. The EU delegation to Chișinău explained why: 
“The payments issued within the Macro-Financial Assistance program are 
conditioned by the successful implementation of certain measures of economic 
policy keeping with mechanisms of democracy, the constitutional state, and 
human rights”28.  
For the regime in Chișinău, the bad news continued when the European 
Parliament voted, on July 5, for a resolution that condemns the missteps of 
Chișinău authorities29. The draft of the resolution was prepared by PPE, but it 
was voted by 6 of the 8 groups, with 345 votes for, 160 votes to abstain, and 
only 35 votes against
30
. The wide consensus among political groups confirms 
the agreement that exists between the chief EU institutions, namely the 
Commission, the Parliament, and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), with regard to the Republic of Moldova.  
Romanian member of the European Parliament Cristian Preda, who 
presented the project for the resolution, was categorical in his statements: “Not 
one Euro ought to be sent to Chișinău until the following conditions are 
fulfilled: the validation of local elections in Chișinău, the investigation of the 
bank fraud known as the billion-dollar theft”31. The decision to cancel the 
elections, Preda continued, was taken by the oligarch Plahotniuc, and not by the 
courts of justice. “The cancelling of the ballot shows us once again that the state 
is taken over by a single person and that today, in Chișinău, justice is used to 
settle political disputes, while Moldova is a state seized by an oligarch who 
does not wish for his business and his clan in Chișinău to see any danger as a 
result of Andrei Năstase’s becoming mayor”32.   
                                               
European Union in the Republic of Moldova, @EUDelegationMoldova, July 6 at 6.49 
PM, https://www.facebook.com/EUDelegationMoldova/?hc_ref=ARRwjrigoITOkgfSq 
gdFbC6Zy88-aQ5E425XIPclOCTT3W0lUHHNhcPXXi0piZ_ss-o&fref=nf  (Accessed 6 
July 2018). 
29  “European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the political crisis in Moldova 
following the invalidation of the mayoral elections in Chișinău”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2018-
0303&language=EN&ring=P8-RC-2018-0322 (Accessed 6 July 2018). 
30  “The political crisis in Moldova following the invalidation of the mayoral elections in 
Chisinau (vote)”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=PV&reference= 
20180705&secondRef=ITEM-006-01&language=EN&ring=P8-RC-2018-0322 (accesat 
la 6 iulie 2018). 
31  „Parlamentul European recomandă Comisiei să suspende orice plăti pentru Moldova”, 5 
iulie 2018, http://www.ipn.md/ro/arhiva/92205 (accesat la 6 iulie 2018).  
32 Ibidem.  
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The resolution urges the European Commission to suspend any 
payments of macro-financial assistance, but also installments for budget support 
for the Republic of Moldova. The assistance is to be resumed only after 
Parliamentary elections and under the condition that the latter take place in 
conformity with international standards. This is to be monitored and evaluated 
by specialized international bodies.  
Given that the majority of the press in Chișinău is controlled by DPM 
and PSRM, the two chief political forces, the resolution of the European 
Parliament quickly became the target of a manipulation campaign organized by 
the two television trusts. As a matter of fact, Vladimir Plahotniuc had 
designated the battle plan as soon as the justice courts invalidated the result of 
the elections. In the press controlled by Plahotniuc, several analysts and 
politicians explained that the annulment of Andrei Năstase’s mandate is 
allegedly the work of enemies of DPM, while the latter has absolutely nothing 
to gain following this decision. Both Plahotniuc and other leaders of DPM 
transferred the responsibility for cancelling the elections to an electoral 
legislation that was insufficiently clear, as well as to social media, primarily 
Facebook, the use of which should have been regulated in Moldova, as it was 
proven to have the potential to influence the behavior of voters. The pro-
European opposition and the organizations of civil society are worried that the 
establishment will attempt to utilize the invalidation of elections as a pretext to 
constrain freedom of speech and restrict the use of social media, as is common 
in dictatorships. It would appear that the Internet had been targeted for a long 
time in Moldova because, on social media, extra-Parliamentary opposition is 
much more popular than DPM and PSRM. The Internet itself represents the 
only truly free forum since the Plahotniuc-Dodon binomial controls the largest 
part of Moldovan media.  
The spokesperson for DPMblamed PPE, which includes the two 
opposition parties led by Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase, for the EU 
resolution. According to DPM, PPE “does not support Moldova or its citizens, 
regardless of their political orientations, but rather supports only certain extra-
parliamentary political parties and their leaders”33. The European Parliament’s 
resolution will also  
 
“significantly undermine Moldovans’ trust in the European Union… It is difficult to 
explain to the Moldovans that they endured such harsh reforms only to be faced with a 
decision against their benefit because this is what the leaders of the opposition 
requested, because the government and DPM did not want to intervene against the 
decisions of the courts of justice, which validated the Chișinău elections”34.  
                                               
33 „PDM: E regretabil că războiul politic din Moldova a fost exportat în Parlamentul 
European”, 5 iulie 2018, http://www.ipn.md/ro/arhiva/92208 (Accessed 6 July 2018). 
34  Ibidem. 
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DPM leader Vlad Plahotniuc, immediately following the invalidation of 
the Chișinău elections, initially formulated the latter accusation addressed to 
foreign chancelleries. Simply put, the Moldovan oligarch alleges that the West is 
blackmailing Chișinău by asking it to modify the decisions of “independent 
judges” under the threat of ceasing external financial assistance, thus punishing 
the entire country. In actuality, the EU and the US are asking that the vote and the 
political will of the citizens are respected, and that practices meant to influence 
the judiciary are ceased. Among occidental chancelleries, but also among 
European institutions, the conviction persists that first and foremost, the DPM and 
Plahotniuc personally control the Chișinău administration and the judiciary. 
This war of narratives continued and even escalated in the following 
days. After the resolution was voted in Brussels, in Chișinău, Prime Minister 
Filip and other members of the cabinet took part in a meeting with the leader of 
the EU Delegation to the Republic of Moldova and with the ambassadors of EU 
states to Chișinău. Following this meeting, a statement was released on the 
Facebook page of the Delegation, wherein ideas from previous messages of the 
EEAS, the Commission and the European Parliament were reiterated. The 
statement also mentioned the fact that “until political pre-conditions regarding 
democracy, the constitutional state, and human rights are fulfilled, the payment 
of the first installment of Macro-Financial Assistance remains suspended”35. 
The government immediately criticized the statement because it allegedly did 
not reflect the position of the executive in Chișinău as explained by its members 
during the meeting. An extensive indictment of the EU and its actions in the 
Republic of Moldova followed
36
. 
Thus, in a long statement issued by the government, Prime Minister 
Filip contended “firmly and repeatedly” that the resolution voted by the 
European Parliament is “unfair to the government and politically biased” and 
that it was inspired by two leaders of the opposition (Maia Sandu and Andrei 
Năstase were implied, without being mentioned) who “wished to obtain 
electoral dividends by harming the citizens”37. 
                                               
35  European Union in the Republic of Moldova, @EUDelegationMoldova, July 6 at 6.49 PM, 
https://www.facebook.com/EUDelegationMoldova/?hc_ref=ARSpI86kxBlVwRBPreMft
m54s-fS9xnJml-FYVrg1cQ2bE8BOL9g5fahE71WhlC6Xi4&fref=nf (accesat la 8 iulie 
2018). 
36  „Ce le-a spus Premierul Pavel Filip ambasadorilor UE? Mesaje categorice și foarte sugestive 
legate de activitatea politizată a Delegației UE în Moldova”, Publika tv, 7 iulie 2018, 
https://www.publika.md/ce-le-a-spus-premierul-pavel-filip-ambasadorilor-ue-mesaje-
categorice-si-foarte-sugestive-legate-de-activitatea-politizata-a-delegatiei-ue-in-moldova-
foto_3012036.html (Accessed 8 July 2018). 
37  „Guvernul vine cu unele precizări privind întrevederea dintre prim-ministrul Pavel Filip și 
ambasadorii UE acreditați la Chișinău”, 7 iulie 2018, https://gov.md/ro/content/guvernul-
vine-cu-unele-precizari-privind-intrevederea-dintre- prim-ministrul-pavel-filip-si 
(Accessed 8 July 2018). 
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The reason for the Prime Minister’s aggravation is the sine die 
postponement of installments of contracted financing, given that – according to 
Filip – “all commitments in view of receiving EU financing were fulfilled”38. 
Through this resolution, the European Parliament is allegedly “punishing” the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova because the government “did not follow 
through with the abusive requests to illegally involve itself in the activity of the 
courts of justice that invalidated the elections in Chișinău”39. Should the 
Europeans consider that Moldovan justice is ineffective, they ought to 
remember that the latter was reformed with the assistance of European experts 
and representatives of civil society, financed through European funds. In other 
words, European partners are equally responsible for the status quo within the 
justice system, because they participated to its reform. Nevertheless, Pavel Filip 
is generous with the EU and extends an invitation to the Delegation in Moldova 
to carry out, together with the government in Chișinău, “a profound analysis” of 
the justice reform so that they may find out what went wrong in this partnership.  
Following this cold shower applied to the EU ambassadors, at least 
according to the statement of the Moldovan government, Filip turned to brighter 
thoughts and assured the former that “in spite of this abusive political resolution 
against the Republic of Moldova, the government will continue to implement 
reforms and even to initiate new ones”40. At the same time, the government in 
Chișinău “will remain firmly engaged with the European path, the only viable 
strategic option for the modernization of the country”41.   
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
European money is important, yet more than this is at stake. An entire narrative 
about the oligarch Plahotniuc and his pro-European government is invalidated 
by the harsh response to the shortcoming of the regime in Chișinău, coming 
from Brussels and Washington. At the same time, it is difficult to explain how a 
country like Moldova, which is so dependent on Western aid, could go to such 
lengths in disregarding its own electorate so as to cancel the mayor elections 
simply because their results did not sit well with the establishment. Nothing of 
this kind ever took place, even in Belarus, Azerbaijan, or Russia. More 
shocking is that this happened in a country, which, not long ago, was considered 
to be the foremost example of the Eastern Partnership. It may be said that the 
regime of the oligarch Plahotniuc was given a blank check by the West, which 
                                               
38  Ibidem.  
39  Ibidem.  
40  Ibidem.  
41  Ibidem.  
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allowed him to develop an authoritarian regime, shielded by dissimulation and 
lies. In the wake of the crisis set in motion by the invalidation of local elections 
in Chișinău, Plahotniuc’s regime can count only on the support of Bucharest, its 
last remaining sponsor. In fact, neither the Presidential Administration, nor the 
government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest took a stand against 
the missteps in Chișinău.  
With or without the support of Bucharest, the regime in Chișinău can 
count on other sources of funding in order to survive. It was not accidental that 
immediately after the resolution of the European Parliament, the Filip 
government made progress in the implementation of the program responsible 
for granting Moldovan citizenship in exchange for investments. Moldovan 
authorities expect that no less than 1.3 billion Euros will be collected during the 
following five years
42
.  
Yet the survival of the regime will depend not so much on foreign aid 
or on resources it will manage to access, but rather on the tempering of the 
social atmosphere. Today, Moldova is like a boiling pot. If this tension is 
maintained until Parliamentary elections, which is unlikely given that fatigue, 
frustration and disappointment might intervene, a space favorable for ample 
social disobedience might be created, similarly to recent events in Erevan and 
Tbilisi, which have led to the resignation of the Armenian and Georgian governments. 
 
                                               
42  Ion Presca, ”Moldova Hopes ‘Golden Visa’ Program Will Bring in € 1.3 Bill”, Organized 
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 12 iulie 2018, https://www.occrp.org/en/27-
ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/8319-moldova-hopes-golden-vis a-program-will-bring-in-1-3-
bill (Accessed 13 July 2018); Мальтийский след. Компания – партенер правительста 
Молдовы фигурировала в расследовании убитой журналистки, 12 июля, 
http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/maltiyskiy-sled-kompaniya-partner-pravitelstva-moldovy- 
figurirovala-v-rassledovani-38259  (Accessed 13 July 2018).  
